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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
CHARLES B. ROBISON, Case Editor
EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF AccoM-
PUCE-CORROBORATION. - [Illinois]
The credibility of the testimony of
an accomplice has given rise to
various rules governing its weight
in convictions based almost wholly
upon such evidence. In a recent
Illinois case, People v. Karatz, 365
Ill. 255, 5 N. E. (2d) 842 (1937),
it was stated that a conviction pro-
cured on the uncorroborated testi-
mony of an accomplice "will not be
molested where the facts and cir-
cumstances testified to by such ac-
complice, when weighted and tested
according to the established rules
applicable thereto, are sufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." In this case, however,
there was evidence strongly tend-
ing to corroborate the accomplice.
The court also remarked that the
law was well settled that the record
must be free from substantial and
prejudicial error. People v. Gor-
don, 344 Ill. 422, 176 N. E. 722
(1931) noted (1932) 22 J. Crim. L.
743. The "established rules appli-
cable thereto" have reference to the
Illinois practice that the jury
should be instructed to consider the
testimony of an accomplice with
great care and caution (Hoyt v. Peo-
ple, 140 Ill. 588, 30 N. E. 315 (1892)),
and should not give it the same ef-
fect as that of other witnesses.
People v. Rongetti, 338 Ill. 56, 170
N. E. 14 (1930); People v. Lawson,
345 IMI. 428, 178 N. E. 62 (1931).
A substantial number of states
have the same rule, that a convic-
tion can be had without corrobora-
tion if the testimony proves guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. State
v. Cianflone, 98 Conn. 454, 120 AtI.
347 (1923); Caldwell v. State, 50
Fla. 4, 39 So. 188 (1905); Stone v.
State, 118 Ga. 705, 45 S. E. 630
(1903); State v. Vandeveer, 119
Kan. 674, 240 Pac. 407 (1925);
Commonwealth v. Boswofth, 39
Mass. 397 (1839); People v. Nunn,
120 Mich. 530, 79 N. W. 800 (1899);
State v. Shaffer, 253 Mo. 320, 1'61
S. W. 805 (1913); State v. Broke,
99 Ore. 310, 195 Pac. 583 (1921);
State v. Sowell, 85 S. C. 278, 67 S.
E. 316 (f910); Draper v. Common-
wealth, 132 Va. 648, 11 S. E. 471
(1922); State v. Stapp, 65 Wash.
438, 118 Pac. 337 (1911). This is
the rule prevailing in the federal
courts. Ahearn v. United States,
158 Fed. 606 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907),
cert. denied, 208 U. S. 615 (1908);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.
S. 470 (1917). Connecticut, in the
case cited, treated the accomplice
the same as any other witness. In
England the rule is that the judge
should tell the jury that it is with-
in their legal province to convict
upon the uncorroborated evidence,
but he should warn them of the
[134]
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dangers of such testimony. If he
fails to give warning the conviction
will not stand. Rex v. Baskerville
[1916] 2 K. B. 658; Note, Corrobo-
ration of Accomplice's Testimony
(1934) 77 L. J. 336. The same rule
obtains in Canada. See Green-
shields, The Accomplice as a Wit-
ness (1929) 7 Can. B. Rev. 520,
528 et seq.
Other states hold that there must
be corroboration-with or without
the aid of statute. A typical stat-
ute provides that the corroborating
testimony must tend to connect
the defendant with the offense; if
it merely shows the commission of
the offense or the circumstances
thereof, it is not sufficient. ALA.
CODE Ann. (Mitchie, 1928) §5635;
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford &
Moses, 1921) §3181; CAL. PEN. CODE
(Deering, 1931) §1111; N. Y. Cnmm.
CODE (Gilbert, 1936) §399; S. D.
Comp. LAws (1929) §4882; Tsx.
ANN. CODE Cnnw. Pnoc. (Vernon,
1936) art. 718. In such jurisdic-
tions the question remains as to
what is sufficient corroboration.
The following examples will suf-
fice to show the general require-
ments of sufficiency. It is not es-
sential that the corroborative evi-
dence in and of itself be sufficient
to warrant a verdict, or that it cor-
roborate in every detail (Dixon v.
State, 116 Ga. 186, 42 S. E. 357
(1902)); it need go only to some
material part of the accomplice's
testimony (State v. Jones, 115 Iowa
115, 88 N. W. f96 (1901);Drew v.
State, 65 P. (2d) 549 (Okla. Cr.
App. 1937)), but it should tend in
some degree to show the guilt of
the accused. State v. Clements, 82
Minn. 434, 85 N. W. 229 (1901). A
grave suspicion of guilt is not
enough. Harrel v. State, 121 Ga.
607, 49 S. E. 703 (1905). However,
the corroboration is sufficient if it
shows the accomplice testified truly
in some particulars and justifies the
inference that he testified truly in
others. Keliher v. United States,
193 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 1st, 1912);
State v. Arhontis, 196 Iowa 223, 194
N. W. 209 (1923). California, hav-
ing a statute like that above, re-
quires the corroboration to be ef-
fective for more than merely rais-
ing a suspicion of guilt (People v.
Davis, 210 Cal. 540, 293 Pac. 32
(1930)), though it is sufficient if
the connection of the defendant
with the commission of the offense
may be inferred therefrom. People
v. Whittaker, 63 P. (2d) 1202 (Cal.
App. 1937); People v. Rokes, 64 P.
(2d) 746 (Cal. App. 1937) (admis-
sions of defendants); Hargett v.
State, 189 S. E. 675 (Ga. App. 1937)
(slight evidence from extraneous
source). New York, following its
statute, states that the cbrrobora-
tion must lead to the inference that
a crime was committed and that the
accused was implicated. People v.
Evans, 143 N. Y. S. 49 (1913). But
though the statute provides that
the corroboration must go to the
extent of connecting defendant
with the crime, the court has said
that this need not show the com-
mission of the crime, nor defend-
ant's connection therewith, nor
need it be restricted to any par-
ticular point, but is sufficient if it
merely tends to connect him in
such a way as may reasonably
satisfy the jury that the accomplice
is telling the truth. People v.
Crum, 272 N. Y. 348, 6 N. . (2d)
51 (1937); People v. Dixon, 231 N.
Y. 111, 131 N. E. 752 (1921). Mon-
tana holds that the statute is satis-
fied if the independent evidence
tends to connect the defendant with
the crime. State v. Ritz, 65 Mont.
180, 211 Pac. 298 (1922). Accord:
Shields v. Commonwealth, 203 Ky.
118, 261 S. W. 865 (1924).
Such are the rules governing the
testimony of an accomplice. Which
rule is wisest is hard to say. It
seems that no state allows a con-
viction solely on the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of an accomplice
unless it alone proves guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Most states
require that it be considered with
grave caution and suspicion, and,
as in Illinois, it is reversible error
not to so instruct the jury. Except
in a very few jurisdictions the tes-
timony cannot be considered in the
same light as that of any other wit-
ness. On the other hand are those
states requiring corrobation. Yet,
even when a statute enforces this
rule, it is found that the slightest
corroboration is sufficient-it need
go only to some material fact or
tend to connect the defendant with
the commission of the crime. The
strict limitations imposed by those
states such as Illinois, compared
with the extreme laxity of such
states as California or New York,
leads one to conclude that after all,
the rules tend to merge and the
same result is ultimately reached,
whichever is applied.
CHARLES B. RoBisoN.
WITNESSES - BASTARDY PROCEED-
INGs-TETIONY BY WIFE or NON-
AccEss OF HuSBAND. - [Pennsyl-
vania] Prosecutrix, a married
woman, in a prosecution for for-
nication and bastardy, and failure
to support an illegitimate child,
testified as sole witness that she
had intercourse with the defendant
as a result of which a child was
born, and that she had been sepa-
rated from her husband for a peri-
od of three and one-half years dur-
ing which time she had neither
seen nor had sexual relations with
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him. Defendant was convicted up-
on this testimony. On appeal, re-
versed. Held: A wife whose hus-
band is living and undivorced can-
not be permitted to bastardize her
child by testifying to her husband's
non-access. Commonwealth v. Di
Matteo, 188 AtI. 425 (Pa. 1936).
A strong presumption has al-
ways existed that a child born of
a married woman, whose husband
is alive, is legitimate. See Note
(1931) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 561. Prior
to the eighteenth century, however,
there was no definite rule concern-
ing the testimony of either spouse
to prove non-access of husband as
evidence of a child's illegitimacy.
4 Wicaopx, EviDENCE (2d. ed. 1923)
§2063. Lord Mansfield in Good-
right v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591 (1777),
set forth for the first time, as
obiter dictum, the rule that "Dec-
larations of a father or mother
cannot be admitted to bastardize
the issue born after marriage."
This rule, stated to be predicated
upon "decency, morality and pol-
icy," has been severely condemned
by Professor Wigmore. 4 WiGmoRE
§2063-64. HoweVer, the fact re-
mains that Lord Mansfield's .rule
has been accepted in many juris-
dictions in this country. Illustra-
tive of these are Iowa and Texas.
In Craven v. Selby, 216 Iowa 505,
246 N. W. 821 (1933), a suit to par-
tition property, the court held that
a wife cannot establish the ille-
gitimacy of her son born in wed-
lock by testifying to the non-access
of her husband. In United States
Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Hen-
derson, 53 S. W. (2d) 811 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932) a proceeding to
set aside a compensation award,
the English rule and the underly-
ing reasons therefor were un-
equivocally adopted.
A problem of interpretation aris-
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ing under the non-access rule is
whether a wife is precluded from
giving only direct testimony of
non-access of her husband, or
whether she is also precluded from
testifying to collateral facts from
which non-access may be inferred.
In Franks v. State, 26 Ala. 430, 1'61
So. 549 (1935), it was stated that
"She may testify to circumstances
from which non-access may be in-
ferred, but she may not testify that
her spouse is not the father." Ac-
cord: Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark.
113, 173 S. W. 842 (1918); State v.
Green, 210 N. C. 162, 185 S. E. 670
(1936): This interpretation of the
Mansfield rule permits the wife to
do indirectly what she could not do
directly. See criticism in 4 WIG-
MORE §2064. A more reasonable
interpretation is taken by other
courts in prohibiting testimony of
collateral facts as well as direct
evidence showing non-access. In
re Wright's Estate, 237 Mich. 375,
21f N. W. 746 (1927); Scanlon v.
Walshe, 118 Md. 131, 31 Atl. 498-
(1895); In re McDermott's Estate,
125 Neb. 179, 249 N. W. 555 (1933);
Bell v. Territory, 8 Okla. 75, 56 Pac.
853 (1899); Richter v. Richter, 117
Ore. 673, 245 Pac. 321 (1926);
Koenig v. State, 215 Wis. 658, 255
N. W. 727 (1934). The Kentucky
court, in Veron's Adm'r v. Veron,
228 Ky. 56, f4 S. W. (2d) 185
(1925), intimated that the wife may
testify only where there is other
testimony showing non-access of
the husband. In Kansas the law is
unsettled. In Lynch v. Rosenber-
ger, 121 Kan. 601, 249 Pac. 682
(1926), an action for partition of a
deceased's estate, the testimony of
the mother was admissible to prove
non-access. This case, using Pro-
fessor Wigmore's arguments, at-
tacks the Mansfield rule. "In our
opinion the so-called Lord Mans-
field rule is artificial and unsound.
Being so, it should neither be used
to suppress the truth nor to pre-
vent substantig justice." However,
in Martin v. Stillie, 129 Kan. 19;
281 Pac. 925 (f925), an action for
the recovery of real property, the
court reverted to the Mansfield
doctrine in its entirety. It may be
significant to add that the court
felt that the action had become a
public nuisance; perhaps the old
rule was revived only to suppress
further litigation.
From time to time statutes have
been passed in the various states
affecting the admissibility of the
kind of testimony in question. Some
of these are Bastardy Acts with
provisions for competent witnesses.
Others are general evidence stat-
utes liberalizing common-law pre-
cedent. In State v. Soyka, 181
Minn. 533, 233 N. W. 300 (1930),
a statute made every person of
sufficient understanding, including
the parties, competent to testify in
any action. Mimh . STAT. (Mason,
1927) §9814. Under this provision
both husband and wife were held
competent to give evidence that the
former was not the father of a
child of the wife. In re McNamara's
Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552
(f919), cites the California Code
of Civil Procedure (Deering, 1931)
§1879, providing that "all persons,
without exception . . ." may be
witnesses, and holds that on the
basis of this statute a wife is to be
permitted to testify to the non-
access of her husband. In re
Wray's Estate, 93 Mont., 525, 19 P.
(2d) 1051 (1933), involving a stat-
ute similar to the one in California
(MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. (Ander-
son & McFarland, 1935) §10534),
and also a bastardy statute permit-
ting rebuttal of the presumption of
legitimacy (Id. §5832) specifically
states that "our legislature has ab-
rogated the common-law-or bet-
ter say-the Mansfield rule." Cf.
Adams v. Adams, 102 Vt. 318, 148
Atl. 287 (1930) (rule not appli-
cable in divorce cases). In the
state of Arkansas a bastardy stat-
ute makes a mother a competent
witness in bastardy cases, unless
she is legally incompetent in any
case. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford
& Moses, 1921) §783. However, it
was held in Kennedy v. State,
supra, that to make the mother
competent to testify to the non-
access of her husband an express
statute was necessary. Lord Mans-
field is cited with approval. Ac-
cord: Scott v. State, 173 Ark. 625,
292 S. W. 979 (1927). The bas-
tardy statute in West Virginia pro-
vides that a married woman may
not accuse a person other than her
husband unless she has lived apart
from him for at least one year. W.
VA. CODE ANN. (Mitchie, 1932)
§4770. Another statute makes both
"husband and wife competent and
compellable witnesses to testify for
and against each other to any and
all relevant matters, including the
fact of such marriage and the par-
entage of such child . . . ." Id.
§4781. In State v. Reed, 107 W. Va.
563, 149 S. E. 669 (1929), a child
had been born to prosecutrix with-
in one year of separation from her
husband. The court approved the
Mansfield rule, and refused to ap-
ply the second statute mentioned
above, arguing that the suit was
not one in which one spouse was
called to testify against the other
since it was neither against the
husband or wife, but against a
third party. A similar technic was
used to reach a contrary result in
State v. McDowell, fOl N. C. 734,
7 S. E. 785 (1888). But in Illinois
the Bastardy Statute (ILL. STATE
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BAR STATS. (1935) c. 17, §6), mak-
ing the wife a competent witness
on all issues, permits the testimony
of non-access. However, when the
husband of the prosecutrix testi-
fied that he was not the father, the
admission of such testimony was
held reversible error: "by no law
has the common-law rule as to the
husband been removed to allow
him to testify to his non-access at
the time of the conception of the
child." People v. Dile, 347 Ill. 23,
179 N. E. 93 (1932).
Some states rely solely upon
bastardy acts to admit testimony
of non-access. In all other pro-
ceedings, however, the Mansfield
rule retains its influence. In New
York the non-access of a husband
may be shown by a wife only in
prosecutions under the Bastard,
Act. The statute referable to pa-
ternity proceedings reads: "If the
mother is married both she and
her husband may testify to non-
access." INF. Crim. CTs. ACT (Gil-
bert, 1936) art. 5, §67. In City of
New York v. Zizzo, 260 N. Y. S. 169
(1'932), the wife's testimony was
admitted. However, in the case of
In re Barthels Estate, 177 N. Y. S.
565 (1919), an action arising upon
the distribution of an estate, the
court said, "for reasons of public
decency and morality, a married
person cannot say that an offspring
is spurious." Cf. In re Smith's Es-
tate, 242 N. Y. S. 464 (1930). In-
diana and Massachusetts are other
states in which the Mansfield rule
has a similar anomalous status.
Evans v.. State, 165 Ind. 369, 75 N.
F. 651 (1905); Kreighbaum v. Dins-
more, 88 Ind. App. 693, 165 N. E.
526 (1929); Commonwealth v. Cir-
co, 199 N. E. 896 (Mass. 1936);
Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514,
134 N. E. 346 (1922).
There thus seems to be a general
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reluctance on the part of courts to
abandon the precedent set by Lord
Mansfield, especially in the absence
of statutes. Does it not seem pe-
culiar, however, that the best qual-
ified witnesses, the husband 'and
wife, should be prohibited from
testifying as to whether or not an
offspring is spurious?
GERAID MILLuw.
NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT-TAx ON
Dw.AEPs.-[Federal] The extend-
ing arm of federal control in the
suppression of organized crime and
the public interest therein renders
significant the recent decision of
the Supreme Court of the United
States upholding the constitution-
ality of Section 2 of the National
Firearms Act. 48 Stat. 1237 (1934),
26 U. S. C. A. §=1B2a (1935). This
section imposes a $200 annual li-
cense tax on dealers handling cer-
tain types of firearms, essentially
sawed-off shotguns and subma-
chine guns, defined in Section 1.
Violations of the Act are punish-
able hy a fine of $2,000 or imprison-
ment for five years or both.
Petitioner, who was convicted by
the District Court for Eastern Illi-
nois of unlawfully carrying on the
business of dealer in firearms with-
out payment of the special tax, was
granted certiorari solely on the
question of the constitutionality of
Section 2 of the Act, the conviction
on a count involving that section
alone having been sustained by the
circuit court of appeals, 86 F. (2d)
486 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936). The Su-
preme Court held that the imposi-
tion of a $200 annual tax on dealers
in firearms is constitutional as a
valid exercise of the taxing power
of Congress, refusing to look be-
yond the face of the Act to con-
demn it as a regulation of matters
beyond the power of Congress.
Sonzinsky v. United States, 57 S.
Ct. 554 (1937).
The Supreme Court in refusing
to consider the unexpressed regu-
latory aspects of this taxing statute
merely conformed to its policy of
long standing, first clearly ex-
pressed in the early case of Veazy
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. 533 (1869).
There, in commenting upon the
contested federal tax on state bank
currency, the Court said, "It can
hardly be doubted that the object
of this provision was to inform the
proper authorities of the exact
amount of paper money in circu-
lation with a view to its regulation
by law." Yet, since the statute on
its face was no more than an ex-
cise tax, its constitutionality was.
sustained. Compare the statements
of District Judge Ritter in another
case sustaining the National Fire-
arms Act: "Te (Act] is a revenue
measure. Back of it may have been
a motive to prevent racketeers,
bank robbers, and desperadoes
from obtaining sawed-off shotguns
and machine guns to run wild in
crime and to enable the govern-
ment to trace ownership; but where
there is a power to tax, which
from a reasonable construction can
be construed to be the intention,
the imposition of the tax is the de-
termining feature and cannot be
treated as being without the power
because of the destructive effect of
exercise of the authority upon the
article or business connected there-
with." United States v. Adams, 11
F. Supp. 26, 218 (S. D. Fla. 1935).
The Court rejected defendant's
contention that the Act violated the
Second Amendment to the Consti-
tution preserving the right of citi-
zens to bear arms, stating that it
refers only to the militia.
Federal regulation of other dis-
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favored articles through the taxing
power has long received the sanc-
tion of the Supreme Court. The
suppression of oleomargarine prod-
ucts in favor of butter by an equal-
izing tax on the former was held a
constitutional exercise of the fed-
eral taxing power in the famous
case of McCray v. United States,
195 U. S. 27 (1904); Vail Butterine
Co. v. Reinecke, 39 F. (2d) 1076
(1931); Cf. In re Kollock, 165 U. S.
526 (1897). And the source of
federal control over narcotics is
found in the several excise taxes
on producers, importers, dealers,
etc., of narcotic drugs imposed by
the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act.
That Act was initially held consti-
tutional in the case of United
States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86
(1919) and has been repeatedly
sustained up to the present. See
Watson V. United States, 16 F. (2d)
52 (1926), cert. denied, 274 U. S.
739. The National Firearms Act
closely follows in form the Harri-
son Anti-Narcotics Act as amended.
It may safely be stated that the
attempts by Congress to regulate
in forbidden fields through the tax-
ing power have failed when the
taxing act expresses regulation on
its face. Such was the case in
United States v. Constantine, 296
U. S. 287 (1935), where a special
annual excise tax of $1,000 on re-
tail liquor dealers when they op-
erate contrary to state or munici-
pal law was held a penalty rather
than a tax, the effect being to usurp
the police powers of the states,
rendering the Act unconstitutional.
Similar holdings may be found in
the Child Labor Tax case, 259 U. S.
20 (1922), and Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936)
(Guffey Coal Act unconstitutional).
Although petitioner here was in-
dicted in a second count for vio-
lation of Sections 3 and 4 of the
National Firearms Act, the circuit
court of appeals held that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support a
conviction thereunder. The Su-
preme Court thus had no oppor-
tunity to pass upon the constitu-
tionality of these sections. Sec-
tion 3 imposes a patently prohibi-
tive tax of $200 upon each transfer
of a firearm described in Section 1,
and Section 4 requires identifica-
tion of purchasers, including their
fingerprints. Section 3 is more
open to the interpretation of being
a penalty than is Section 2, espe-
cially in the light of the fact that
the Treasury reports for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1936, showed
some revenues from the tax on
dealers of $3,965, and from manu-
facturers $1,176, ;whereas but one
purchaser paid the $200 transfer
tax and filed. his fingerprints and
photograph. See N. Y. Times, No-
vember 6, 1936, at 52. This article
quoted a member of the Depart-
ment of Justice as saying: "We
certainly don't expect gangsters to
come forward to register their wea-
pons and be fingerprinted, and a
$200 tax is frankly prohibitive to
private citizens. . . . The purpose
of the act was to give us a check
on all weapons being manufactured
and to permit us to prosecute any
person found in possession of an
unregistered weapon."
The Supreme Court has noted,
in sustaining the Harrison Anti-
Narcotics Act, that its provisions
have produced substantial revenue
and contain no regulatory matter
beyond that necessary to adminis-
ter the tax. Alston v. United States,
274 U. S. 289 (f927). Since Sec-
tions 3 and 4 of the Firearms Act
seemingly produce little or no rev-
enue, and their regulatory features
are more apparent than Section 2,
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it is quite possible that the Court
would refuse to sustain this portion
of the Act.
[Recently the attorney general
has asked Congress to require every
owner of a rifle, shotgun, revolver
or pistol to register his weapon
with the bureau of internal rev-
enue. A tax of one dollar would be
payable for every firearm sold. The
attorney general stated that this
legislation would broaden the scope
of the present Act and "would
place a potent weapon against
criminals in the hands of law-en-
forcement officers." See Chi. Daily




eral] On February 2, 1936, de-
fendant was indicted for violation
of the National Motor Vehicle Act;
on February 15th he pleadedguilty
and two days later the district
court sentenced him to one year in
the federal prison camp, but re-
tained jurisdiction, referring the
case to the probation officer. The
defendant was remanded to the
custody of the marshal for execu-
tion of the sentence. The proba-
tion officer made his report on July
15th and the court ordered the
defendant to be placed on proba-
tion for the remainder of the sen-
tence. The government's motion to
vacate the order was denied [and
an appeal was taken]. United
States v. Wittmeyer, 16 F. Supp.
1000 (D. C. Nev., 1936).
Originally there was no statutory
probation under the federal prac-
tice, but the courts themselves
adopted their own remedy through
the medium of indefinite suspension
of sentence. Thus it became the
practice in the case of a first of-
fender, where the charge was not
too serious, to pass sentence but
suspend the execution thereof dur-
ing good behavior. However, in
Ex parte United States, 242 U. S.
27 (1916), the Supreme Court de-
nied the federal courts' right to
thus suspend sentence no matter
how justifiable the circumstances.
It was announced to be the court's
duty to sentence and commit the
defendant to prison the moment he
either pleaded or was found guilty.
In 1925 Congress, by enacting
the Probation Act (43 STAT. 1259
(1925), 18 U. S. C. A. §724 (1927),
provided that a trial court, in the
proper instances, shall have power,
"after conviction or after a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere . . . to
suspend the imposition or execu-
tion of sentence and to place the
defendant upon probation for such
period and upon such terms and
conditions as they may deem best."
Just when Congress intended this
power to be invoked- may be in-
ferred from the reports of the com-
mittee that drafted the Act: "The
result of long experience with the
probation system shows that it is
far easier to reclaim an unhardened
early offender without commitment
to prison than after it." House Re-
port No. 1377, 68 Cong., 2d. Sess.
(1925). From this it would seem
to have been the Congressional in-
tent to keep those entitled to pro-
bation out of prison and away from
experienced criminals. Has this
purpose been acknowledged?
In United States v. Murray, 275
U. S. 347 (1927), the Court, in
denying probation to one who had
served part of his sentence, said:
"Probation was not sought to
shorten the term. . . The begin-
ning of the service of the sentence
in a criminal case ends the power
of the court even in the same term
to change it." This language is un-
doubtedly much broader than was
required for the decision, but it has
been.followed except in the case of
the reduction of sentence in the
same term. Thus in United States
v. Bentz, 282 U. S. 304 (1931),
where the defendant had been sen-
tenced to ten months in prison, and
in the same term, after commit-
ment, he petitioned the court for
a reduction, the sentence was re-
duced to six months. However, in
Mouse v. United States, 14 F. (2d)
202 (D. C. Kan., 1926), and in
Davis v. United States, 15 F. (2d)
697 (W. D. Ark., 1926), probation
was denied the defendants because
they had served part of their sen-
tences; the trial court was held to
have lost jurisdiction upon com-
mitment of defendants and passage
of the term. This position is
strengthened by the case of In re
Edelson, 15 F. Supp. 1086 (M. D.
Pa. 1936), where the court was
held to have the power to place the
defendant on probation even after
the expiration of the term provided
he had not begun service of his
sentence; and in United States v.
Praxulis, 49 F. (2d) 774 (W. D.
Wash. N. D. f931), it was held
where service of sentence was be-
gun that the prisoner's remedy was
either by parole or pardon.
From this it seems clear that the
court's jurisdiction in the instant
case ceased by the commitment of
the defendant and the expiration
of the term; but may the court, by
merely stating to do so, reserve
jurisdiction to investigate the ad-
visability of probation? This right
seems to have been denied, in sub-
stance, in Archer v. Snook, 10 F.
(2d) 567 (N. D. Ga. 1926). In this
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case the defendant was sentenced
to two years in prison but was to
be placed upon probation for the
remainder of the term after having
served six months. In holding the
order for probation void the court
said that interference with the ex-
ecution of sentence after commit-
ment should not be attempted "un-
less by the clearest legislative war-
rant." This "warrant" was found
to be lacking in the Probation Act.
In United States v. Greenhaus, 85
F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936),
the court held an order for proba-
tion nugatory when service of part
of the sentence was a condition
precedent and was entered upon.
To the same effect is White v.
Burke, 43 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A.
10th, 1930). What possible distinc-
tion can be drawn between the
above sentences and the one in the
instant case? Both seem to en-
counter the criticism of Judge Sil-
by as expressed in the Archer case:
"By their incarceration, the shame,
stigma and criminal contact, which
the probation system sought in
proper cases to avoid, will have
already been accomplished."
If a court invokes the authority
given by the Act, its wording
should be strictly followed. It is
there provided that probation may
be granted after conviction or after
a plea of guilty. But this must be
done by the suspension of either
the imposition or execution of the
sentence. Since imposition or ex-
ecution of sentence necessarily oc-
curs before commitment, the stat-
ute apparently requires the grant-
ing of probation prior thereto.
Mere reservation of jurisdiction in
the sentence itself would not seem
to authorize later suspension.
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